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Competing Visions of a Green World 
Order: Transatlantic Tensions over 
Environmental Governance
Momchil Jelev
We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if man-
kind is to survive.  Albert Einstein
I think the environment should be put in the category of our 
national security. Defense of our resources is just as important as 
defense abroad. Otherwise what is there to defend?
Robert Redford, Yosemite National Park dedication, 1985
I. Introduction
The literature on environmental citizenship has established that funda-
mental changes in human consciousness and a restructuring of politi-
cal institutions are necessary for a truly global environmental reform to 
take place. Not only do political actors need to reformulate the agenda 
of nation-states and civil society groups but, even more importantly, 
individuals need to reach a new level of connectivity to their peers 
around the globe, not just through ideas, but also through genuine 
solidarity. The literature points to different avenues for achieving this, 
without a clear argument of where the global leadership on the issue 
lies, as well as what ought to be done concurrently on the institutional 
and personal level.
In trying to present a possible answer to this theoretical limitation, 
I focus on two entities that have been largely responsible for the estab-
lishment and growth of the environmental movement and for putting 
the issue itself on the global agenda. One calls itself a state and the 
other is anything but a cohesive political entity in the Westphalian tra-
dition. Moreover, because we talk about the environment, an issue that 
calls for the leadership of developed countries, looking at the two most 
powerful among them is critical. The United States of America and the 
European Union (EU) together comprise less than a sixth of the world 
population. Yet together they account for more than two-thirds of the 
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global GDP. They also contribute almost half of the current environ-
mental degradation in the world, not even accounting for the historic 
harm that their rapid industrialization has left to future generations.1 
This is why looking comparatively at the United States and the EU 
within the context of the environment is the most convenient vantage 
point for a meaningful discussion of what environmental citizenship 
means and entails, and what it should be in order to succeed. This will 
provide valuable lessons not only for America but for the world as a 
whole, as the ramifications of the issue are undeniably global.
II. Central Premises and Main Argument
Two premises support my main argument. First, I argue that true global 
citizenship is exercised by those who think beyond the notions of geo-
politics and through the lens of biosphere politics. Saving our biosphere 
is a common problem for all countries and by far transcends immedi-
ate geopolitical concerns. This fundamental shift in understanding is 
critical both for institutions and for citizens. Achieving it represents 
what Sigmund Freud calls the “third stage of human consciousness,” 
a connection with nature, rather than an adversarial relationship with 
it, which is also fostered by a sense of global empathy with peoples in 
places far away from one’s home and country.2 In an illustration of the 
need for a paradigm shift on the individual and institutional levels, I 
examine the extent to which the United States and Europe have moved 
towards biosphere politics, the quintessential question for all countries 
at the present time.
Second, I view environmental citizenship (often construed as a 
bottom-up phenomenon) as profoundly grounded in and dependent 
upon leadership (often misconceived merely as a top-down process). 
It is important to understand that citizenship cannot be divorced from 
leadership because no social, political, or economic movement of any 
considerable proportion in the entire history of humanity has been 
devoid of guiding vision and agency. Citizenship derives its opera-
tional power from individuals (or institutions, or states) with ideas and 
purpose that are able to reach a convergence point between an objec-
tive and an existing structural circumstance. Only in this way are they 
able to drive others (whether with a bottom-up or top-down approach) 
to push boundaries and take action on issues that go against existing 
political, economic, or cultural conditions. Thus, I understand leader-
ship as an exemplary model of institutional vision and action that dem-
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onstrates civic ambition and dedication, and inspires other peoples and 
nations. This, in fact, is the fault line along which the U.S. and Europe 
diverge. Recognizing the validity of these preliminary premises is at 
the core of this essay’s claims.
My main argument is twofold. First, the European Union has 
emerged as the global environmental leader in terms of institutional 
willingness to act and depth of fundamental individual and collec-
tive values. America ought to follow and adopt some of the ideas 
promoted by Brussels because both Washington and environmental 
activists have failed to articulate and implement a broad vision for our 
common biosphere. The question, then, becomes how this divergence 
in environmental policy has emerged, particularly between two politi-
cal entities so close in history, values, and principles. To answer this 
question, I look at the historical, institutional, and cultural fault lines 
that have shaped the European and American worldviews.
Secondly, from a normative perspective, America ought to transi-
tion to becoming a “Green state,” not only on the institutional but 
also on the personal level.3 Citizens should understand how critical a 
“biosphere mentality” is, and institutions ought to accept the issue as 
the central existential challenge to our world. In addition, both govern-
ments and citizens ought to move beyond the concept of the state as the 
field of environmental action and nurture a sense of global empathy 
and compassion, not only for others today, but also for the future gen-
erations that will inherit the environmental challenge. Global empa-
thy instead of self-interest, interrelatedness instead of entrenchment, 
inclusiveness instead of suspicion, and constructive dialogue instead 
of intractable negation are some of the assets of the European leader-
ship model. When coupled with American creativity, innovation, and 
personal responsibility, these represent the intersection between vision 
and action that the environmental movement across the world vitally 
needs. The EU is ahead in achieving these Green state principles, but 
often struggles with poor implementation and translation of rhetoric 
into action.
The essay is divided into three parts. I first examine the paths that 
have led the U.S. and Europe in different directions on the environmen-
tal question. Here, history reveals the various markers of difference. 
Second, I critically analyze the European and American experiences in 
environmental leadership, highlighting the institutional and cultural 
disparities between the two, as well as the roots of Europe’s compara-
tive advantage. At the same time, I also pay attention to the limitations 
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of the European model. Last, I look into the future and try to offer 
some normative ideas about ways in which America could become a 
Green state, espousing a hybrid vision of environmental citizenship 
that transcends the familiar national borders and borrows from the 
European experience.
III. Historical Canvass
It is important to understand that among the major global challenges 
of the current moment, environmental consciousness is one of the lat-
est arrivals. Hence, it is still far from being completely accepted and 
understood. The issue (re)emerged in the 1960s and was first addressed 
by the United States. America began to understand the human impact 
on the environment and the dire effects the problem could have in 
the long run. Even though in the U.S. the environmental movement 
and the federal institutions are separate entities, they are fundamen-
tally interdependent and initially moved on parallel tracks vis-à-vis 
the main environmental questions. For example, in the 1960s and ’70s, 
activists and public opinion pressured government to pass a number 
of vital laws, including the Clean Water and Air acts, as well as legisla-
tion related to preserving wildlife and preventing deforestation. Envi-
ronmental issues were largely nonpartisan and there were bipartisan 
agreements on the principal challenges. State policy began to focus on 
ways to reduce consumption and limit carbon emissions, thus slow-
ing the process of degradation and preserving biodiversity. The U.S. 
led global efforts on the issue, assisting in the organization of the first 
international environmental summit in Stockholm in 1972, under the 
auspices of the United Nations.
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, these policies were gradually 
abandoned and a period of retrenchment followed because America 
was once again concerned with its own economic growth (as a result 
of the recessions of the 1980s). On one hand, activists became compla-
cent and arrogant after the early successes in the previous decades. 
On the other hand, institutions were no longer obliged to respond to 
public pressure on the environment, especially in the face of the imme-
diate economic problems. The White House was hardly focusing on 
the environment, since productivity, job creation, and income were on 
the top of the agenda. The new Republican socio-economic coalition 
focused on economic conservatism and emphasized the omnipotence 
of the market in solving economic problems. The old belief that con-
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cern for the environment and economic growth are mutually exclusive 
resurfaced in official rhetoric. Throughout the 1990s, President Clin-
ton tried to address the issue domestically and through international 
multilateral institutions, but animosity in Congress thwarted most of 
his initiatives and, as Shellenberger and Nordhaus explain, the envi-
ronmental movement was relegated to merely another public interest 
group in D.C.4
This brief period of renewed concern abated with the election of 
President George W. Bush in 2000. As a traditional conservative, he 
was not only primarily focused on sustaining the economic power 
of the U.S., but overall the environment failed to seriously enter the 
Republican agenda. At the same time, the events of 9/11 fundamentally 
shifted U.S. policy interests and created a new period of retrenchment 
on the issue, coupled with animosity toward traditional European 
allies and international organizations, especially within the context of 
the Iraq war. Hence, institutional leadership at the highest level is still 
lacking from the world’s leading economy and most significant mili-
tary power.
Meanwhile, the fledgling European Union, established with the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, was never seriously considering the issue of the 
environment, especially because it was within the powers of various 
member states and could not be addressed as a Union concern. It was 
not until the 1987 Single European Act that the institutional makeup 
of the EU was sufficiently altered to allow for environmental policy to 
be articulated entirely on the Union level.5 As a result, the EU began to 
formulate a common environmental policy, which was removed from 
national control through the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.6
Particularly since Maastricht, the EU has voiced its strong support 
for the principle of sustainable development, both domestically and 
internationally, even though reluctance vis-à-vis new environmental 
policies followed periods of European internal struggles. Most recently, 
the Union articulated a comprehensive climate and energy policy as a 
response to growing concerns about climate change. The ambitious 
agenda includes cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, producing 
20% of necessary energy from renewable resources, and increasing 
energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020. The proposal has been opposed 
by national industries and environmental activists alike; the former see 
it as too interventionist and the latter as insufficiently ambitious. Nev-
ertheless, in the words of Commission President Manuel Barroso, this 
is “the most far reaching set of legislative proposals to be made by the 
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show how a modern economy can be designed to meet the challenge. 
This is sustainable development in action.”7 This is what a bold yet rea-
sonable vision for the future looks like, and its implementation is likely 
because it also takes into account economic and political constraints.
Abroad, under the influence of increasingly conclusive information 
about climate change, the Union has pushed for multilateral agree-
ments on cutting greenhouse emissions through concrete limits and 
timetables at each international environmental summit. Even though 
the single voice of the EU on global environmental issues is a function 
of its internal cohesion as a political entity, the Commission has man-
aged to articulate a single European position on issues like climate 
change, biodiversity, and hazardous waste. (This does not preclude the 
existence of elaborate national environmental policies in various mem-
ber states, which are, however, coordinated with the central authorities 
in Brussels.)
The EU resolve has often been blocked by American skepticism and 
reluctance to engage in regulation for fear of serious economic costs. 
Overall, the adversarial relationship between the two economic giants 
has revealed a deep division, which has been conditioned by both 
institutional and cultural underpinnings. While the EU has remained 
an advocate for sustainable development and a commitment primar-
ily by developed countries to cut greenhouse emissions, the U.S. has 
continued to oppose any multilateral treaties that do not include the 
fast-growing developing states (primarily China and India) or seem to 
burden excessively (as determined by Washington policymakers) the 
American economy.
IV. Contrasting Perspectives on the Environment
A. Institutional Makeup
A comprehensive overview of American and European action on the 
environment demands a careful analysis of the different institutional 
structures of the two aspiring “Green Giants.”8 The decision-making 
mechanisms on each side of the Atlantic have strongly conditioned 
the environmental agenda both in terms of rhetoric and action. While 
both are considered dynamic political entities, the European Union 
has undergone a much more intensive and accelerated transformation 
in the past sixty years. The EU is not a “superstate,” and has a limited 
Civic Forum 2008
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mandate over policies outside the purview of its member states. In 
fact, the entire European project has been the result of multilateral 
negotiations and bargaining, resulting in significant pooling of sover-
eignty between a diverse group of nations (already 27). In contrast, the 
U.S., though also a relatively recent political project, is a single nation-
state that has clear guiding principles and powers at each level of gov-
ernment (federal, state, local) and is no longer in a state of flux in terms 
of its identity and institutional structure. This underlying difference 
between the EU and America leads to several concrete divergences in 
the conception and implementation of environmental policy.
First, the EU, by its own design, relies much more heavily than the 
U.S. on international organizations and multilateral avenues for solv-
ing global issues. Contrastingly, the notions of freedom, sovereignty, 
and independence are deeply rooted in the U.S., which condition the 
country’s uneasiness when acting in concert with other states in the 
international arena. This difference partially justifies the fundamental 
disagreements between Europeans and Americans over global envi-
ronmental policy and any multilateral binding agreement. Examples 
of these stretch back to the Rio Conference in 1992 and have continued 
through the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, reaching the recent tensions at the 
2007 Global Summit in Bali. At each of these fora, the U.S. has remained 
reticent about concrete commitments, reluctant to accept timelines or 
requirements for cutting greenhouse emissions.
Second, the European Union has included the principle of sustain-
able development within its official policies, requiring a number of 
sectors—from transport and agriculture to industry and tourism—to 
adopt it in their practices. In this way, the EU has been constantly 
involved in the direct implementation of environmental policy, often 
interfering in the workings of the market. As Knill argues, “EU envi-
ronmental policy is much more than an ad hoc collection of individual 
measures.”9 There is, he claims, an underlying policy on the envi-
ronment rooted in common European cultural and historic values (as 
will become clear in the following section). Contrastingly, the U.S. has 
tended to rely more on market forces than strong regulation. This has 
not only been a product of the beliefs of particular presidents—Rea-
gan and Bush (father and son)—but it is an idea that reflects the very 
essence of the American spirit of independence and self-reliance. This 
has prevented Washington from articulating a bold and broad environ-
mental vision that translates into particular policy implementation.
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Third, partisan divisions over the environment are much more acute 
in America than in Europe. This largely stems from the absence of a 
clear consensus on the issue among all levels of government. Repub-
licans have become increasingly conservative on the topic, refusing to 
allow for environmental regulation and claiming that it would reduce 
the competitiveness and strength of the U.S. economy. At the same 
time, the past twenty years have seen only a single brief period (1993–
1994) when the same party had control of both the legislative and 
executive branches. This has made it harder to promote international 
and domestic environmental initiatives, which have to pass through 
the U.S. Senate with a wide majority, a feat often impossible to achieve. 
There is no such issue on the other side of the Atlantic, where the envi-
ronment has been accepted as a priority by all parties and leaders in 
the Union. The topic has unified the European Parliament, forcing the 
European Commission to seriously engage the issue and propose con-
crete solutions, while working in concert with the non-governmental 
sector. Meanwhile, the majority of civil society profoundly supports 
action on the environment, pushing both NGOs and governments to 
act both on a national and continental level.10
This also explains the fourth major institutional difference. In 
Europe, the NGO sector is much more tightly related to the govern-
ment than in America. In fact, NGOs in Brussels are granted consul-
tancy status and are directly subsidized by the European Commission. 
In this way, a major part of civil society is strongly supported by gov-
ernment and works closely with it, while retaining independence and 
a strong voice for lobbying and protection of various interests. This is 
particularly true for environmental NGOs. The European Environmen-
tal Bureau, an umbrella of more than 160 environmental NGOs, has 
been created and directly subsidized by the European Commission.11 
This notwithstanding, proposals and policy are also crafted by more 
traditional transnational actors, such as the European Environmen-
tal Advisory Councils. In contrast, the United States relies on a clear 
separation between government and NGOs to the extent that the latter 
are not only perceived as external forces in Washington but are often 
engaged in an adversarial relationship with government, whether it is 
the legislative or the executive branch.
Finally, activists in the U.S. have pointed out the arrogance and 
complacency that ensued among environmentalists after the initial leg-
islative victories in the 1970s. Their focus on specific issue areas is too 
narrow and falls prey to stronger lobbies and special interests in Wash-
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ington. Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus expose this reality in 
a compelling argument in The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warm-
ing Politics in a Post-Environmental World. The authors claim that the 
obsolete strategies of the U.S. environmental movement have under-
mined its power, particularly in the challenging environment since 
the advent of the Bush Administration. Shellenberger and Nordhaus 
explain:
In their public campaigns, not one of America’s environmental leaders is 
articulating a vision of the future commensurate with the magnitude of 
the crisis. Instead they are promoting technical policy fixes like pollution 
controls and higher vehicle mileage standards—proposals that provide 
neither the popular inspiration nor the political alliances the community 
needs to deal with the problem.12
In other words, the piecemeal approach to the environment has 
almost doomed the movement in the U.S., and while old achievements 
continue to fuel the self-assurance of many activists, the times have 
fundamentally changed. As the authors show, in the last twenty years 
the U.S. has not passed a single piece of domestic or international leg-
islation of significant consequence (similar to the Clean Air or Clean 
Water Acts of the 1970s) that provides a step forward in seriously 
tackling the environmental challenge. Hence, they see the need for a 
fundamental paradigmatic shift in the mentality of American activists 
and, as a result, in their messages and actions, in order to make citizens 
and institutions alike realize the full scope of the existential threat of 
environmental degradation. While some changes in citizen action have 
appeared since Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ 2005 article, the change 
in rhetoric has not percolated through the entire civil society or the 
main institutional stakeholders.
In this context, the institutions of the EU, while still fragile, have 
overtaken the U.S. in global environmental leadership. This is mani-
fested in rhetoric on sustainable development, internal political consen-
sus about the importance of the environment, and efforts to articulate 
a new environmental agenda both among the member states and glob-
ally. Europe’s example is an appropriate model for America if it seeks 
to reclaim its central position in the global environmental conversa-
tion. Certainly the U.S. is essential for addressing global warming due 
to its sheer size and impact, but it is no longer the power that shapes 
the principles and agenda behind environmental reform. A look across 
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the Atlantic could give Washington a clue as to how it could regain a 
more positive discourse and attention to the environment globally but 
also in the domestic arena. However, an explanation of the growing 
gap between European and American leadership is also grounded in 
the cultural underpinnings of both societies.
B. Culture and Values
Scholars agree that the U.S. and Europe’s environmental policies, pre-
viously aligned in principle and approach, have recently diverged.13 
This has also been reflected in the citizens’ awareness and responses to 
the problem. Indeed, Americans and Europeans tend to perceive the 
environmental questions differently, and the roots of this often-unex-
pected reality are grounded in deep historical and cultural disparities. 
They help in understanding both the institutional divergence outlined 
earlier, as well as the asymmetry of awareness and action among citi-
zens. Granted, the generalizations that I will make in this section can-
not be applied universally, but I argue that their validity is nonetheless 
significant.
When looking at environmental citizenship in the United States, it 
is critical to discuss elements of the American psyche, in particular the 
frontier mentality that still defines the country and the ideas of indi-
vidualism and consumption. When the first European settlers arrived 
in the New World, they discovered a harsh landscape and insecurity 
due to natural (and human) threats, but a great potential for wealth 
along with the great danger for survival and subsistence. In a land 
where brutish lifestyle and draconian action and sacrifice defined one’s 
existence and success, the individual was put in opposition to native 
inhabitants and the forces of nature, which could easily destroy him 
on the frontier. Bringing with them the tenets of the Enlightenment, 
many of the European settlers who first moved to the U.S. applied the 
idea of domination over the unruly natural world as a determinant of 
one’s personality and one’s concrete chances for survival and progress. 
Overall, the frontier mentality has deep roots in every aspect of Ameri-
can culture and institutions and provides perhaps the biggest marker 
of difference between the Europeans who stayed and those who left for 
the New World.
Closely tied to this idea, individualism stems from the teachings of 
Luther and Calvin in Europe, but it truly expanded in meaning in the 
lands of the New World. One’s self is defined not only by one’s per-
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sonal relationship to God, but also by one’s autonomy and mobility, 
which embody the “go-it-alone” mentality of the frontier. It is impor-
tant to understand that there is nothing natural in this quintessentially 
American characteristic. It was partly shaped by the religious and cul-
tural particularities of the European settlers. Then it was conditioned 
by the harsh existence in the new land, which required qualities such 
as independence, persistence, and a clear sense of “mine versus thine” 
in an uncertain and adversarial world. Thus, the teachings of Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke took much deeper root in the U.S. than in 
Europe and have proven resistant to change ever since.14
Consumerism is also deeply embedded in the American tradition. 
Its roots go back to both the particular tenets of Protestantism and the 
immediate reality in the New World, but its full impact followed the 
expansion of industrialization and market capitalism. Americans are 
the biggest consumers of natural resources in the world. The U.S. uses 
up more than one-third of the Earth’s energy even though it has only 
5% of the world population. The implications of such irresponsible 
consumption have been far-reaching, but its intimate relationship to 
the American “way of life” has discouraged a popular drive for envi-
ronmental reforms. It is clear that changes at the institutional level are 
necessary but insufficient for the U.S. to reduce its energy consumption 
and foster true environmental citizenship as long as consumption lev-
els in society remain so high. This demonstrates the critical importance 
of personal choice and action, the essence of true global citizenship.
Contrastingly, Europe has managed to carry out a paradigm shift 
of policies, implementing regulations using neoliberal strategies 
that target sustainable development. It has also educated aware and 
involved citizens that predominantly consider the environment a cen-
tral concern for the continent and beyond. Brussels is unified behind 
the concept of ecological modernization—that the environment and 
the economy are not engaged in a zero-sum relationship, but rather 
growth and development can be achieved while preserving high envi-
ronmental standards.15 This concept is still questioned in the U.S., thus 
limiting the power of the environmental message. This has put the EU 
into a position of leadership globally, offering a model of growth that 
has the environment as its central concern and a notion of morality 
that perceives that all humans are part of a common biosphere with no 
regard to borders and difference.
For Europeans the principles of inclusiveness, the primacy of human 
rights, and a level of market restraint at the expense of individual 
11
Jelev: competing visions
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2008
Civic Forum 2008
100
freedom are central. The importance of collective responsibility and 
compassion towards the other trump the focus on individualism and 
competition. One’s existence is profoundly grounded in one’s rela-
tionship to others within a large social network that provides more 
equality and more interdependence than exhibited in the U.S. This is 
reflected not only in the European social model but also in the per-
sonal relationships of assistance and solidarity among Europeans of 
different backgrounds.16 Hence, the respect for the environment is also 
deeper, as the citizen’s mentality is concerned with the welfare and 
interests of others, and those are intimately tied to the environment. 
Moreover, when discussing growth and progress, the EU, much more 
than the U.S., tends to refer to the ideas of sustainable development 
and a responsible use of resources. Research into alternative energy 
sources has received a warmer welcome than in Washington. Fifty-six 
percent of Europeans say “it is necessary to fundamentally change our 
way of life and development if we want to halt the deterioration of the 
environment.”17 This shows a clear commitment on the civil society 
level to a vision of the indivisibility of the Earth and the transnational 
nature of the issue.
In this context, Europe is ahead of the U.S. in claiming the moral 
high ground and reaching the “third level of consciousness” that 
Freud describes. After all, it is important to remember that the EU 
itself has largely emerged as the first transnational political network, 
transcending the traditional notions of politics and power embedded 
in the human psyche after Westphalia. It is a political system in which 
no single player dominates the network and everyone has the right to 
some input and a portion of the output. The challenge then remains for 
the new generation of Europeans to turn the moral principles that gov-
ern the EU into more concrete action. Unlike the American model of 
individualism and autonomy, which has resisted the challenges of the 
time regardless of the circumstances, the European political model and 
its foundations are fragile and have not been proven against internal 
and external challenges. Nevertheless, the moral potential for moving 
from inter-state power struggles (geopolitics) to inter-state cooperation 
in defense of our common natural resources (biosphere politics) now 
exists, and as Eckersley recognizes, the European Union gives us the 
hope that a true transnational democracy is possible as the major tool 
for generating environmental citizenship.18 He contends, “At present, 
the European Union represents perhaps the closest real world approxi-
mation of a green Kantian or post-Westphalian culture.”19 However, it 
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is uncertain how far such a culture is likely to spread internationally, 
where moral persuasion more often takes a back seat to coercion and 
self-interest in inter-state negotiations.
V. Waking up to the Reality
The analysis I offer here neither suggests that the United States is 
fundamentally flawed as a potential environmental leader nor does it 
seek to extol European excellence in tackling this issue. There are com-
mendable characteristics in American culture and institutions as well 
as significant weaknesses in the European approach to decision-mak-
ing. In fact, the U.S. culture of personal accountability and responsibil-
ity could be a helpful tool for developing personal ethics vis-à-vis the 
environment. Grounded in the Protestant tradition and one’s personal 
obligations before the afterlife, this has created an ethic of hard work 
and dedication to any enterprise. A sizable number of Americans have 
used these intrinsic values to advocate for environmental reform, gal-
vanize the powers of civil society, and pressure policymakers to adopt 
the legislative measures to bring the U.S. back to leadership in the 
environmental arena. The challenge remains to change the mentality 
of the majority, people who still live in the previous level of conscious-
ness, wherein the individual and national self-interest trump any con-
sideration for a truly global ethics and empathy for people across the 
world. As Shellenberger and Nordhaus explain:
Environmentalists are in a culture war whether we like it or not. It’s 
a war over our core values as Americans and over our vision for the 
future, and it won’t be won by appealing to the rational consideration of 
our collective self-interest.20
Moreover, the entrepreneurial spirit, innovation, and creativity that 
have transformed the U.S. into the strongest single economy in the 
world could be the tools for translating the vital mentality shift into 
concrete action. Shellenberger and Nordhaus use venture capitalists 
as a model that environmentalists ought to adopt because inaction 
is worse than action that has failed. While technology is unlikely to 
single-handedly resolve environmental degradation and stop global 
warming, when coupled with a particular worldview among citizens 
and governments, it can certainly move environmental citizenship to a 
new level of accomplishment on a global (rather than only a national) 
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level. This is where America’s comparative advantage lies and its 
potential for leadership resides.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that aside from its 
guiding moral principles, the EU environmental policy is primarily the 
result of functional logic. It is based not on some fundamental grand 
design, but rather on a number of actions that have coalesced into 
an increasingly comprehensive and independent policy field within 
the Union framework. This does not mean that the EU’s environmen-
tal policy is a fortuitous coincidence but recognizes that Brussels is 
not always concerned with the long term. Moreover, many European 
countries have a long way to go before they successfully complete the 
environmental modernization project, especially as former commu-
nist republics with lower environmental standards have entered the 
Union. Nevertheless, countries in Scandinavia and Western Europe 
have already set the benchmark, and Brussels is unlikely to let the 
newcomers dilute this common priority.
Notwithstanding the compelling and persuasive European environ-
mental rhetoric, the reality remains that consumption and pollution 
levels in the EU are not significantly lower than in the U.S. Moreover, 
despite the success of environmental regulatory competition between 
European states, the implementation of these policies and their har-
monization with EU-level principles has been notoriously inefficient. 
Indeed, the EU possesses a strong cultural and institutional connection 
to the issue of the environment, but there is still a stark discrepancy 
between rhetoric and action in terms of concrete reductions in emis-
sions or moderation of personal consumption. This is what I call the 
“intent-action gap,” which reveals the oftentimes tremendous differ-
ence between European moral arguments and ambitions and concrete 
implementation and action. This ought to be tackled with the joint 
efforts of Brussels and civil society, borrowing some of the research 
and innovation that characterize the American experience. Nonethe-
less, as Vig and Faure assert, “the commitment to the idea of sustain-
able development is playing an important role in defining the identity 
of the EU, both internally and externally, and in legitimizing the entire 
European integration project.” They continue:
It also allows the EU [to lead] as a normative power (as opposed to 
military power) in international politics…a major difference with the US. 
Thus, despite limited policy achievements to date, it can be argued that 
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the declaratory values of the EU will put it on an increasingly divergent 
course with the US in the future.21
I would like to examine the last claim that Vig and Faure propose, 
which suggests a long path of divergence between the U.S. and the 
EU. In my view, this would be disastrous for the global environmental 
agenda. From a normative perspective, only convergence between the 
two cultural and governance models can lead to the formation of a 
viable vision for saving our environment.
VI. Space for Convergence: A Normative Perspective
At the conclusion of the essay, I will offer some normative ideas about 
the notion of environmental leadership as well as the particular ways 
in which it can be operationalized through a hybrid Euro-American 
approach, taking the best practices from each side of the Atlantic and 
perhaps once again bringing the United States back to the forefront 
of environmental policy and action. At the outset, I will reiterate that 
the issue at hand is not a national phenomenon and cannot be defined 
within the borders of a particular state. In fact, I would argue that in 
order to fully grasp the notion of a global vision for the environment 
and the conditions necessary for its integration into the human psyche, 
we need a new lens through which to look at some basic political con-
cepts.
First, we ought to develop a new understanding of the state and 
human relations. Indeed, the familiar Westphalian paradigm that 
divides the world into closed nation-states, each pursuing its own 
political and economic interest, is no longer suitable to analyze intrin-
sically global challenges and gear leadership to biosphere politics. The 
environment is not divided into states; it does not obey artificial politi-
cal or economic boundaries, nor does it reflect social inequalities. This 
is a problem for all humans, of every walk of life, every race, ethnicity, 
religion, and social class. This is an issue that is bigger than the petty, 
socially constructed differences that humans have cultivated amongst 
each other for thousands of years. This is an issue that ought to unite 
us, because there is no such thing as more worthy environments and 
less worthy ones, poorer or richer ones, black or white ones, Muslim 
or Christian ones. Instead, there is one environment and a single bio-
sphere in which we all live. Thus, if we accept this basic premise, that 
the environment is at its core a transnational challenge that transcends 
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other differences between humans, then we have to discover a new 
political framework, different from the state, through which people 
can engage in true environmental citizenship.
As Eckersley argues, if states begin to cooperate within a new Kan-
tian, post-Westphalian system, the chances for genuine environmental 
cooperation and multilateralism are greatly augmented.22 No longer 
can states afford to operate within the familiar Hobbesian paradigm of 
chaos, confrontation, and raw individual interest. In order to seriously 
tackle problems like climate change and global warming, a fundamen-
tal paradigm shift is necessary. I see a day when governments view 
their actions within a global context, and ordinary citizens develop a 
sense of profound empathy for other humans who are facing the same 
long-term challenges triggered by environmental degradation.
Second, it is necessary that there emerge a “hybrid” approach to 
environmental citizenship, grounded in the European values of inclu-
siveness, cooperation, and solidarity, but conditioned by the critical 
American attributes of personal accountability and responsibility. The 
commitment to sustainable development as well as the civil society 
and wide government support that exist in Europe ought to blend with 
the entrepreneurial, creative spirit of America. Market forces alone 
cannot solve the issue, but the European tradition of community, inclu-
siveness, and strong government involvement seem to be the appropri-
ate counterparts of the American model, holding the potential to bring 
environmental citizenship to the fore of the international arena, not 
just through rhetoric, but also with concrete avenues for action. This 
will help America create a new environmental narrative grounded in 
empathy for the entire human race and our shared natural world.
The reality of environmental degradation demands that the entire 
world must be the guardian of our biosphere and no single continent 
can completely rectify the current situation. Hence, the complemen-
tarity of the American and European civic mentalities and govern-
ment models is the most appropriate approach to fostering people’s 
global consciousness, individual responsibility and accountability, and 
the necessary leadership among politicians and civil society for the 
engagement in genuine and effective environmental citizenship. Such 
a well-balanced mechanism has the potential to deliver results and 
quickly attract the attention and commitment of the rest of the world.
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VII. Conclusion
I have attempted to lay out a new vision of environmental citizenship 
by searching for a qualitatively different model of human mentality 
and leadership in transcending geopolitics and adopting biosphere 
politics as the modus operandi of the future. There are two underly-
ing premises of the argument: (1) global citizenship requires a funda-
mental paradigmatic shift beyond geopolitics, and (2) environmental 
citizenship is inherently grounded in the notion of leadership. With 
this preliminary conceptual canvass in place, I offered a comparative 
study of the European and American environmental policies as they 
relate to the particular culture and institutions residing on each side 
of the ocean. Throughout the past decade, it has become evident that 
global leadership on environmental issues currently resides in Europe, 
a claim that the literature fails to make. However, it is also clear that 
the U.S. has lost its global leadership on the issue because it fails to 
articulate a coherent vision about the future grounded in fundamental 
values of human empathy and compassion and a harmonious relation-
ship with nature. The fundamental difference between environmental 
activists and institutions on the two sides of the Atlantic stems from 
the deep historic and cultural markers that have shaped the American 
and European experience.
As a result, a new global consciousness among citizens and within 
institutions should be cultivated for the formation of genuine empa-
thy that binds us on the issue of the environment. Moreover, there 
are important lessons that leaders in American government and civil 
society can extract from the European experience in terms of cultural 
and institutional particularities. Europe’s moral and cultural principles 
complement the U.S. culture of innovation and accountability. How-
ever, it will take leadership by individuals and groups to make this 
step and look beyond the domestic for clues on solving an intrinsically 
global problem.
In conclusion, I have tried to use what we already have as two of 
the most successful models of governance and civil consciousness to 
offer a new model of environmental citizenship and leadership that 
can have a global application. Granted, this is merely one view of an 
extremely complex and politically loaded issue. Yet, within the cur-
rent mentality of nation-states, political and economic division, and 
entrenched individual allegiances, the environment cannot receive the 
attention and serious commitment it deserves only within national 
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borders. It must be on a global level. A new paradigm of political and 
personal identity ought to be coupled with a clear leadership vision 
among institutions and individuals in order to elevate the bits and 
pieces of environmental action and commitment that we have now 
into a genuine environmental citizenship and leadership for our com-
mon biosphere. For Americans, articulating and implementing this 
vision depends on a single look across the Atlantic.
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